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There have been precipitous declines in wild bee populations in many Northern Hemisphere 
countries (Stokstad 2012). We know that bees exposed in laboratory conditions to non-lethal 
quantities of neonicitinoids – a class of compounds used in insecticides – suffer from memory 
and navigation problems (Desneux, Decourtye and Delpuech 2007). Therefore, scientists 
have investigated whether wild bee populations might be negatively affected by neonictinoid 
exposure. Two recent experimental studies claim to have shown such a link (Henry et al 
2012; Whitehorn et al 2012). However, there are doubts over whether they provide high-
quality evidence about real-world scenarios, for example because wild bee populations might 
be exposed to lower doses of insecticide than in experimental set-ups (Stokstad 2012). This 
debate is heated, because the political, economic and ecological stakes are high; arguably, a 
collapse of bee populations is worse than unnecessarily banning neonicitinoids – not only in 
ecological but in economic terms – but an unnecessary ban could seriously damage 
agricultural productivity. 
 
On the one hand, it might seem that scientists should bear in mind the potential non-epistemic 
costs of failing to say that neonicitinoids are dangerous when in fact they are when deciding 
whether the evidence warrants that claim. Like many, I feel the pull of these concerns. In §1, 
I develop an account of scientists’ communicative obligations, based on familiar arguments 
about “inductive risk”, which apparently justifies such an indirect role for non-epistemic 
values in scientific inference. On the other hand, allowing non-epistemic values to play this 
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role in scientific inference might seem problematic. Scientific research contributes to what 
Kitcher calls “public knowledge”, “that body of shared information on which people draw in 
pursuing their own ends” (Kitcher, 2011, p.85). Given that different people hold different 
values, a value-laden science may fail to contribute to “public” knowledge. I think this is a 
serious concern, which outweighs the considerations in favour of a value-laden science. 
Therefore, in §§2 and 3, draw on an unusual combination of Kant and Richard Jeffrey to 
argue that scientific inference aimed at public communication should not take account of 
non-epistemic concerns, thereby blunting the arguments in §1. §4 discusses how these 
arguments relate to scientists’ broader communicative obligations, including in neonicitinoid 
research, and to on-going debates over inductive risk and proper scientific inference. In 
conclusion I outline the broader implications of my arguments for understanding the “value 
free ideal” for science.   
 
§1 Inductive risk and the Floating Standards Obligation 
 
In 1953, Richard Rudner claimed that the scientist qua scientist “accepts or rejects 
hypotheses”, but no hypothesis is ever completely verified by the available evidence; 
therefore, decisions about acceptance must turn on whether the evidence is “sufficiently 
strong” (Rudner, 1953, p.2). More recently, Heather Douglas has set out a similar problem: 
all agents, including scientists, face choices about whether to make empirical claims which 
are not deductively implied by available evidence (Douglas, 2009, p.87). Both argue for a 
similar response to these problems. For Rudner, decisions about whether evidence is 
sufficiently strong are “a function of the importance, in the typically ethical sense, of making 
a mistake in accepting or rejecting the hypothesis” (p.2, emphasis in original). Douglas 
argues that everyone, including scientists, has a moral responsibility to “consider the 
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consequences of error” (p.87) when making claims. Therefore, science is not value-free, in 
that “scientists should consider the potential social and ethical consequences of error in their 
work, they should weigh the importance of those consequences, and they should set burdens 
of proof accordingly” (p.87). 
 
Rudner’s argument convinced many philosophers: for example, Hempel (1965) and Gaa 
(1977). More recently, following Douglas’s work, the “argument from inductive risk” has 
become commonplace, assumed in work by Kitcher (2011, 141-155) and Kukla (2012, 853-
855) with discussions of its theoretical implications (Steel, 2010) and its practical 
implications (for “trust” in science (Wilholt, 2012) and model construction (Biddle and 
Winsberg, 2012)). Indeed, some now claim that her argument does not go far enough (Brown, 
forthcoming). In this paper, I will follow Rudner and Douglas in assuming that scientists face 
problems of “inductive risk”. I will, however, dispute their claims about how scientists must 
respond to these problems. To understand my proposals first it is necessary to clarify the 
problem, to present the strongest version of the Rudner/Douglas “floating standards” 
response, and to note just how radical that response is. These are the tasks of this section.  
   
Inspired by Rudner and Douglas, I understand cases such as neonicitinoid research as 
follows. An expert (or group of experts) must decide whether or not to assert a claim – that 
neonicitinoids deplete wild bee populations – which is supported, but not deductively 
implied, by available evidence. In making this decision, she runs significant inductive risks 
(Hempel 1965): of a false positive – asserting a claim which is, in fact, false – and of a false 
negative – failing to assert a claim which is, in fact, true. Such a scientist requires (or can be 
seen as employing) an “epistemic standard for assertion”: i.e. a principle specifying how 
much evidence she should have in favour of the claim before asserting it. The “higher” the 
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standard – the more evidence required for warranted assertion – then the lower the risk of 
false positives, but the higher the risk of false negatives.
1
 Which epistemic standards should 
scientists employ?   
  
I follow Douglas in framing the problem of inductive risk in terms of assertion, rather than 
acceptance, for two reasons, related to Betz’s insight that arguments from inductive risk are 
best understood in terms of what scientists morally, rather than logically, must do (Betz, 
2013). First, a focus on “acceptance” snarls discussions of inductive risk in questions of 
whether cognitive attitudes should be sensitive to ethical considerations; assertion, by 
contrast, is clearly subject both to epistemic and ethical concerns. Second, a focus on 
assertion avoids a powerful response to inductive risk arguments. Many commentators, 
following Richard Jeffrey, agree that scientific practice involves establishing the degree of 
evidential support enjoyed by propositions, but deny that scientists do (or ought to) accept 
hypotheses outright, claiming that they (should) report degrees of evidential support (Jeffrey, 
1956; Betz, 2013). Even if Jeffrey’s response to Rudner is successful – which is controversial 
because scientists seem to face inductive risk problems in establishing evidence claims (Gaa 
1977; Biddle and Winsberg 2010; Elliot, 2013) – it does not undermine ethical concerns 
about inductive risk and assertion. Claims like “given the evidence, it is extremely likely that 
neonicitinoids deplete bee populations” or “given the evidence, it is unclear that 
neonicitinoids deplete bee populations” do not go beyond the available evidence. However, 
we know that the former is likely to be heard as “neonicitinoids deplete bee populations” and 
the latter as “neonicitinoids do not deplete bee populations”. The moral status of making a 
claim turns not only on what we say, but on how others (foreseeably) interpret what we say 
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 See John (2011, 502) for a slightly different account of “epistemic standards”, which this account builds on. 
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(Saul, 2013). Understanding inductive risk in terms of assertion suggests that, workable or 
not, Jeffrey’s proposal is of questionable moral significance.  
 
Reframed in my terminology, Douglas proposes that when faced by problems of inductive 
risk, scientists should vary their epistemic standards for assertion in proportion to the 
expected consequences of different sorts of error. However, this proposal requires refinement, 
because not all consequences of assertions relate to the ethical status of those assertions in the 
same way.
2
 For example, imagine that a government scientist knows that the claim 
“neonicitinoids deplete bee populations” is not currently well-enough warranted for policy-
makers to act on it. However, she knows that if she reports this lack of evidence then industry 
interests will successfully twist her words to argue that neonicitinoids are clearly safe, a claim 
which could have disastrous consequences. This scientist is, undoubtedly, in a tricky position, 
but it seems strange to say that the fact that lobbyists will mendaciously twist her honest 
report to suit their own ends means that she should change her standards for reporting to 
policy-makers. Even if she is causally responsible for successful lobbying following her 
pronouncement, it would seem strange to say she is morally responsible. By contrast, it seems 
that she is not only causally but morally responsible for the consequences of her assertions 
which stem from her intended audience, policy makers, deferring to her claims. 
  
A simple amendment to Douglas’s proposal can, however, avoid these concerns. Often, 
scientists must set epistemic standards for assertions in situations where they can reasonably 
foresee that if they make a claim, then some intended audience will act on it (for example, if 
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 Elliott, 2011, raises a similar concern although the specific formulation below draws on unpublished work by 
Anthony Woodman. (See Steel and Whyte, 2012 and Elliott and MacKaughn, 2014, for other concerns about 
Douglas’s work).   
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scientists say that neonicitinoids harm wild bee populations, then policy-makers will ban 
neonicitinoids); if they do not, hearers will not act on it (if scientists remain silent, policy-
makers will not ban neonicitinoids). The amount of evidence which decision-makers should 
demand before acting on a claim – their “epistemic standard for acceptance” – should vary 
with the expected practical costs of false positives and false negatives. When we can identify 
an audience for scientific communication, we can also identify a “proper epistemic standard” 
for that audience’s acceptance of some claim.  Indexing scientists’ communicative 
obligations to these standards, rather than to all foreseeable consequences of their assertions, 
suggests a refined version of Douglas’s proposal:  
the “floating standards obligation” (FSO): scientists should consider their audience’s 
proper epistemic standards for acceptance when setting their own epistemic standards 
for assertion.
3
  
 
In the rest of this paper, I will argue against the FSO as a general account of scientific 
communicative norms. To understand the proposal, however, first consider its application. In 
2012 the UK’s Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) instigated an 
analysis of published evidence on neonicitinoids and bees which concluded “while this 
assessment cannot exclude rare effects of neonicotinoids on bees in the field, it suggests that 
effects on bees do not occur under normal circumstances” (DEFRA 2013, 1). This report is 
interesting not for its conclusion, but because the authors assumed, without explicit 
justification, that to conclude that neonicitinoids harm bee populations would require very 
strong evidence, despite the obvious costs of “false negatives”. Interestingly, analyses of the 
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 This reworked communicative obligation might be justified by a more general account of moral responsibility 
(as Douglas justifies her original proposal) or in some other way – such as by appeal to Grice’s “cooperative 
principle” to “make your contribution such as it is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted 
purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged” (Grice 1975, 45). In this paper, I will not 
discuss the broader issue of how to justify communicative obligations more generally. 
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same literature by the European Food Standards Agency (EFSA) concluded that three 
commonly used neonicitinoids – clothianidin, imidacloprid and thiamethoxam – do pose 
significant risks to wild bee populations (EFSA Panel on Plant Protection Products and their 
Residues 2012; EFSA 2013a). Rather, they stressed that they too were careful not to 
extrapolate too far from the available evidence, but disagreed on the proper analysis of that 
data. The FSO implies that these scientists acted wrongly, because they failed to consider 
how the fact that “false negatives” would probably be practically more costly than “false 
positives” might affect policy-makers’ proper standards for acceptance and, hence, their own 
standards for assertion.  
 
Even if this judgment seems plausible, note that the FSO has radical implications. The 
neonicitinoid researchers’ adherence to “high epistemic standards” is not mysterious or 
unusual. Although it is not true that all scientists always adopt “high standards” – in §3, I 
discuss clear counter-examples – “epistemic conservativism” seems a characteristic feature of 
much scientific practice. For example, consider how in statistical testing it is routine to reject 
the null hypothesis and accept the alternative hypothesis only when it is statistically 
significant according to a stringent “type 1” error of 0.05, or, more commonly, 0.01. This 
practice is highly institutionalised: statistical programmes routinely “black box” setting of “p 
values”; journals are reluctant to publish results which are not statistically significant; and so 
on.
4
 DEFRA and EFSA scientists used standards which are deeply embedded in scientific 
practice; they disagreed on their interpretation of the evidence, not on which epistemic risks 
were worth running.  
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 See Ziliak and McCloskey (2007) for extremely thorough discussion of how significance tests are routinised. 
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This point relates back to older discussions of inductive risk. Isaac Levi (1960) responded to 
the Rudner/Jeffrey debate by arguing, contra Jeffrey, that scientists do “accept” hypotheses 
but, contra Rudner, that doing so did not require them to make non-epistemic value 
judgments. Rather, Levi claimed, scientists are guided by community-level “scientific 
standards of inference” (356); the scientist “qua scientist” does not make non-epistemic value 
judgments. If, as I argue, “high epistemic standards” are institutionalised, Levi has a point – 
maybe individual scientists do not have to appeal to non-epistemic values to resolve inductive 
risk problems – but this does not blunt the moral force of the FSO. Pirates might have a code 
of honour which determines which captives to kill. In describing these norms, we might 
define a “good pirate” (say, one who does not kill all the captives). But clearly those norms 
are themselves morally unacceptable. Similarly, taking the FSO seriously does not 
necessarily commit us to thinking that individual scientists – such as those at DEFRA or 
EFSA – acted in a morally culpable manner, but has a far more radical implication: that the 
institutions which govern scientific research systematically incentivise and reward morally 
problematic communication.  
 
2. Publication and the limits of the Floating Standards Obligation  
 
In this section and the next, I argue that there is no need for a radical overhaul of scientific 
institutions. In this section, by distinguishing between “private” and “public” communicative 
contexts, I argue that the FSO cannot govern much scientific assertion. In §3, I argue that in 
public contexts, there are good non-epistemic reasons why scientists should adopt fixed, high 
epistemic standards. (So, even if the reader was unconvinced that use of high standards is a 
characteristic feature of scientific research, I hope she will read on to learn why they should 
be.)    
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In §1, I outlined an argument for the FSO: i.e. when scientists make claims which go beyond 
the available evidence, they should consider their audience’s epistemic standards for 
acceptance and set their epistemic standards for assertion accordingly. However, individuals 
can only be under an obligation if they can fulfil it: “ought” implies “can”.5 Clearly, then, 
scientists can only be under the FSO if they can vary their epistemic standards for assertion in 
proportion to hearers’ epistemic standards for acceptance. In some cases they can: a scientist 
working for a regulatory agency, such as DEFRA or EFSA, might know what paths of action 
are available to her hearer, a regulator, and this can be reflected in the epistemic standards she 
uses. However, the assertions of scientists acting in a regulatory agency, directed at some 
known set of policy-makers, seem distant from paradigm cases of scientific assertion: 
publication in scholarly journals. I shall now show that the nature of publication insulates 
such communicative contexts from the FSO. 
 
Publication is, as the term’s etymology suggests, a form of public communication, a speech 
act where we make claims to a public, rather than private, audience. In “private” 
communication, speakers aim to communicate to ex-ante known individuals. In “public” 
communication, by contrast, speakers communicate to ex-ante unknown audiences. In a 
phrase associated with Kant, in publishing we are “speaking to the world at large”, rather 
than a circumscribed audience (Kant 1970; O’Neill, 1986). Note that the claim that 
publication involves addressing the “world at large” is compatible with someone who makes 
a public claim being able to make reasonable predictions about her likely initial audience 
(“there are only five other people in the world interested and competent enough to read what I 
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 See Howard-Snyder, 1997 for a useful overview of the history and content of this principle. 
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have to say”), and, indeed, compatible with her having an intended audience (“of those five 
people, I want Jane to read my paper”). However, in virtue of the permanence of publication, 
there is always a possibility that ex-ante unidentifiable audiences will hear those claims in the 
future. It is important to clarify that the difference between private and public contexts of 
communication is not merely that it is harder to identify an audience in the latter context than 
in the former. Rather, the difference concerns the very nature of the speech act. In the context 
of “private” communication, it makes sense to think of the audience as a group of, at least in-
principle, identifiable individuals, with identifiable needs, concerns, and so on. In the context 
of “public” communication, by contrast, speakers must make some assumptions about their 
audience, but they cannot, even in-principle, identify the needs, concerns and so on of all 
members of their audience.     
 
The fact that scientific assertion – at least in its paradigm form – is a form of public 
communication creates problems for using the floating standards obligation to assess the 
propriety of such assertions. Even in “private communication”, it is possible that the very 
same assertion might be intended for an audience of more than one hearer, where different 
epistemic standards for acceptance might be appropriate for different hearers’ acceptance of 
the same hypothesis. As such, application of the FSO might be extremely difficult. However, 
in the context of “public communication”, the problem is of a different order: there is no 
identifiable set of individuals for a public communication, and, as such, there is, in principle, 
no way in which a scientist asserting a public claim can vary her standards in proportion to 
hearers’ epistemic standards for acceptance. Therefore, scientists cannot be under a moral 
obligation to govern their public assertions using floating standards. 
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These considerations are compatible with the FSO identifying important considerations about 
scientists’ obligations in private communicative contexts, i.e. contexts where they are ex-ante 
aware of their audience. (Note that a slightly peculiar feature of the private/public distinction 
I borrow from Kant is that it implies that the communication of a publicly-funded body such 
as DEFRA to a public agency can be “private”!) However, they pose a problem for 
understanding that obligation as concerning the responsibilities of scientists qua scientists. 
Before sketching a positive account of public communication in §3, I shall first clarify how 
my claims relate to debates over inductive risk more generally.  
 
First, one might think that the arguments above do not show that Douglas was wrong that 
scientists should use “floating” standards, but, rather, that my apparently friendly amendment 
to her proposal was, in fact, misguided. Rather than claim, as I have proposed, that scientists 
should vary their epistemic standards for assertion in accordance with hearers’ proper 
standards for acceptance, we might return to Douglas’s own proposal: that they should vary 
their epistemic standards in accordance with all foreseeable consequences of error. If so, one 
might claim, scientists should just vary their standards according to the interests of those 
hearers whom they can identify ex-ante. However, even placing to one side the worry set out 
in §1, that such a principle confuses causal and moral responsibility, this response is doubly 
problematic. First, even if we can foresee who will hear our claims, as long as there is more 
than one identifiable hearer, it will be very difficult, probably impossible, to meet the 
“floating standards obligation”. Consider, for example, scientists publishing a review of data 
on neonicitinoids and bees; even if they know that this topic is of interest solely to British, 
American and French policy-makers, given the different agricultural systems of these nations, 
it would be exceedingly hard to consider and balance all the foreseeable consequences of 
error. Second, even if scientists cannot reasonably foresee who might hear them, they can still 
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reasonably foresee that others might well hear them; therefore, they need to take account of 
this possibility. However, it is simply impossible for them to do so, when communications 
are public.
6
 Therefore, the problem with extending the FSO to public communication does 
not lie with the friendly amendment suggested in §1, but reflects a deeper problem with 
balancing risks of error when a communication has many potential audiences. 
 
Second, my argument echoes a key, but often overlooked, aspect of Richard Jeffrey’s 
argument against Rudner’s proposal that scientists must vary their willingness to accept 
claims in proportion to the expected practical costs of false positives and false negatives. 
Jeffrey argued that because any hypothesis might be relevant to more than one decision, “it is 
certainly meaningless to talk of the cost of mistaken acceptance or rejection” (Jeffrey 1956, 
422, emphasis in original). However, Jeffrey makes this claim as part of an argument where 
he assumes that either scientists accept hypotheses (in which case, they should vary their 
standards as Rudner suggests) or they simply report their degree of confidence. His claim 
about the impossibility of establishing “the cost” of mistaken acceptance or rejection is 
intended as a reductio of Rudner’s argument, implying that scientists must (in some sense) 
report evidential probabilities. Discussion of Jeffrey’s work has focused on showing that 
scientists cannot avoid making inductive leaps (Gaa, 1977). This is unfortunate, because it 
occludes important options in debate. Specifically, I have argued that (a version of) Jeffrey’s 
concern about the multiplicity of potential uses of hypotheses implies that scientists simply 
cannot follow a moralised version of Rudner’s recommendations, at least in public 
communication. However, in §1, I also argued that scientists who simply report the 
                                                          
6
 Interestingly, Douglas herself suggests that Kevin Elliott’s ethics of expertise, according to which experts are 
obliged to communicate that information which allows others to make informed choices, is problematic because 
it is unclear who experts’ audiences are (Douglas, 2012).  
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probability of claims may also face moral problems, given how we know their claims will be 
interpreted. Jeffrey’s argument is only partly successful: he is right that we cannot reasonably 
employ floating standards in public communication, but wrong to assume that this shows that 
we can ignore worries about inductive risk entirely.  
       
3. Justifying high epistemic standards 
 
Peter Lipton claimed that the problem of induction had both a descriptive aspect, adequately 
describing actual inductive practice, and a justificatory aspect, explaining how such practice 
is justified (Lipton 2004, Chap.1). Similarly, if we concede, as I do, that scientists face 
problems of “inductive risk”, we can ask both a descriptive question – concerning how they 
do solve those problems – and a normative question – concerning how they ought to solve 
them. In §1 I set out a possible answer to the normative question, that their assertions should 
be governed by the “floating standards obligation”. §2 showed that this conclusion might be 
limited, because the “floating standards obligation” is inapplicable in contexts of public 
communication. At the end of §1, however, I also suggested an answer to the descriptive 
problem: scientists tend to adopt “fixed high standards” (or, more accurately, there are strong 
institutional pressures on them to adopt such standards). Of course, this descriptive answer is 
questionable. However, I shall now argue that, regardless of what actually happens, public 
scientific assertion should be governed by fixed, high epistemic standards.  
 
To introduce my argument in favour of “high epistemic standards”, first consider some 
problems with the FSO which were not discussed in the previous section, concerning 
problems of co-ordination. Torsten Wilholt (2013) has pointed out the following problem: it 
seems plausible that scientists face problems of inductive risk, and, as such, need some way 
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of setting the trade-off between false positives and false negatives. However, if each scientist 
were to set this trade-off in an idiosyncratic way, then scientists would face co-ordination 
problems in deciding when and whether to rely on others’ results. According to Wilholt, fixed 
standards are far more efficient than floating standards, and perhaps even necessary for a 
functioning scientific community.  
 
While Wilholt’s argument identifies an important practical benefit of fixed standards for 
scientific assertion, it does not show why those standards must be “high”, i.e. favour the 
avoidance of false positives over the avoidance of false negatives. Any standard would seem 
to serve the purpose of co-ordinating scientific work! One way in which to justify high 
standards would be by appeal to the distinctively epistemic goals of science. For example, we 
might argue that were scientists to adopt low standards to govern their public assertions, then 
it would be more likely that other scientists who accept their claims would base their research 
on falsehoods, thereby leading to the inclusion of a significant number of falsehoods in the 
corpus of scientific knowledge.
7
 Along similar lines, we might argue that there is an 
important relationship between the use of high epistemic standards and the production of 
“knowledge”, given that beliefs generated in a manner which leads to many “false positives” 
may be the kinds of beliefs which, even if true, we cannot claim to know.
8
 Clearly, there are 
many interesting and important issues to be explored here. However, attempting to justify 
“high” standards by appeal to distinctively epistemic goods seems a mistake in the current 
context. After all, both DEFRA and EFSA scientists might have appealed to such epistemic 
values to justify their high epistemic standards, but use of these standards might still seem 
problematic on non-epistemic grounds. One way of reading the argument from inductive risk 
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8
 The final section of John (forthcoming) develops these points in greater detail. 
15 
 
is precisely as arguing that scientists’ epistemic goals do not grant them a “moral exemption” 
from considering the practical consequences of inductive error. If so, it is unclear that appeal 
to truth or knowledge can serve as knockdown justifications for high standards in public 
communicative contexts. 
 
Therefore, I suggest that a proper defence of use of high epistemic standards should, instead, 
appeal to non-epistemic goods which follow from scientists’ use of such standards. 
Specifically, I argue that we can build on Wilholt’s work to argue that in communities where 
some people are uniquely well-qualified to collect, interpret and assess evidence bearing on 
hypotheses, there are good reasons why those individuals’ “public” claims about those 
hypotheses should be governed by fixed, high epistemic standards. The first step in the 
argument extends Wilholt’s concerns about efficiency beyond communication within the 
scientific community to consider non-experts’ needs in their reliance on scientists. As Philip 
Nickel suggests, audiences’ reasons to defer to scientists are not grounded on the scientist 
offering a personal guarantee of her competence and sincerity, but on the fact that scientists 
“are subjected to public scrutiny by experts applying stringent norms of evidence for 
assertions of that kind” (Nickel 2013, 215-16). From a hearer’s perspective, it is clear why 
fixed standards (if not necessarily Nickel’s “stringent” standards) are beneficial; it is easier 
for a hearer to know how to respond to scientists’ public claims if she can reasonably assume 
that those claims meet a particular standard than if scientists’ standards constantly vary. For 
example, if I know that the social institutions of science are such that scientists very rarely 
make claims unless they are very likely, then I can reasonably assume that some scientist’s 
claim is very likely, whereas if scientists routinely change their standards, I must do more 
digging to discover precisely how well-supported some “public” claim is. Further gains also 
follow. For example, if we know that the institutions which govern public scientific assertion 
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tend to ensure that all such claims meet some standard, S, and policy-makers are committed 
to acting on claims which meet S, then we can more easily hold policy-makers to account 
than if scientists routinely change their standards.   
 
Wilholt suggests that fixed standards generate efficiency gains within the scientific 
community; I suggest that they generate important efficiency gains across the broader 
community. Why, though, think that these considerations favour “high” standards? 
Throughout this paper, I have assumed that individuals should vary their willingness to 
accept (i.e. act on) claims in proportion to the expected costs of acting on false positives and 
false negatives. I suggest that there is an “upper limit” to the proper epistemic standards for 
acceptance; for nearly all agents and nearly all claims, there is some degree-of-evidence such 
that those agents should accept those claims. If each member of an audience has good reasons 
to assume that the institutions which govern scientists’ assertions are such that scientists 
assert claims only when those claims are extremely unlikely to be false, then she can also 
reasonably assume that she should defer to those claims whatever her practical interests. If, 
by contrast, scientists were to adopt lower standards in making public claims, audience 
members would have to do more digging before deciding whether or not they – given their 
practical interests – should defer to those claims. Therefore, the same kinds of efficiency 
reasons which favour the institutionalisation of fixed standards also justify the 
institutionalisation of high standards, at least for public communication.
9
 The heterogeneity 
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 These remarks relate to Edward Craig’s claim (1999) that the social role of the concept of “knowledge” is to 
identify “reliable informants”. I suggest that the institutions of scientific research ensure that scientists are a 
super-“reliable informant”: whatever a hearer’s practical interests, she has reason to defer to what they say.  
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of our practical interests provides us with reason to want there to be institutions which are 
above consideration of practical interests. 
 
This is, of course, a very abstract way of framing matters. Furthermore, it leaves open 
important questions, which I return to below, of what scientists should do when they have 
good but not great evidence for policy-relevant claims, and, relatedly, how non-scientists 
should interpret scientists’ silences. However, this abstract picture does capture real-life 
considerations. For example, were researchers on neonicitinoids, publishing in widely-
distributed journals, to vary their epistemic standards in accordance to the (perceived) costs 
and benefits of policy-makers in one country acting on false positives and false negatives, 
then it would always be an open question whether policy-makers in a second country should 
accept their claims. When, by contrast, scientists’ public claims about such matters are 
governed by fixed, high epistemic standards, we can reasonably assume that all policy-
makers, whatever the country-specific issues involved, should defer to their testimony. Of 
course, this is not to say that there always will or must be a smooth path from scientists’ 
public claims to others’ acceptance of those claims. As the conflicting analyses of DEFRA 
and EFSA illustrate, shared epistemic standards are no guarantee of consensus! However, 
note how much harder it would be for non-experts to decide whom to trust in such cases of 
conflicting testimony if there was disagreement not only over interpreting evidence, but also 
over proper epistemic standards.   
 
§4 Communicative obligations and the problems of institutionalisation 
 
Kantians often argue that when we engage in “public reason” – when we speak (as if) to the 
world – we should be guided by different communicative norms than when we speak to 
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identifiable others – because forms of justification proper in “private” contexts (“I am your 
pastor, so listen to me”) will be improper in “public” contexts (O’Neill 1986). Discussion of 
these topics has tended to focus on political debate (Rawls 1993). I have argued that a similar 
distinction may be important to thinking through problems of inductive risk. In §1, I 
conceded that there is a prima facie plausible argument for the FSO. However, in §2 I argued 
that this obligation cannot be operative in “public communication”. §3 presented a positive 
account of the norms for public communication, in terms of what we might call the “high 
standards obligation”: scientists’ public assertions should be governed by fixed high 
epistemic standards. If I am right that, as a matter of fact, such standards are already 
institutionalised in much scientific practice, then this result may seem underwhelming. 
However, as I will now show, it raises important normative questions about the relationship 
between scientists’ private and public communication and their broader communicative 
obligations.  
 
Even if there are good reasons why “public” communication should be governed by high 
standards, enforced through institutional mechanisms, such standards are clearly not 
unproblematic, for at least two reasons. First, I concede that it is plausible that “private” 
communication should be governed by (something like) the FSO. If, however, scientists are 
subject to (and/or have internalised) institutional pressures proper to “public 
communication”, then, plausibly, they will not vary their standards even when they should. 
As §1 suggested, maybe such a phenomenon is at play in DEFRA and EFSA’s reports on 
neonicitinoids: scientists unthinkingly appealed to norms proper to “public” communication 
to govern “private” communication. At the very least, it seems that a defence of high 
standards also needs to stress the importance of institutional norms and mechanisms which 
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allow and incentivise scientists to adopt “lower” epistemic standards in some “private” 
settings.  
 
Second, perhaps more seriously, limiting scientists’ public assertions only to claims which 
meet high epistemic standards may leave them unable (properly) to say very much at all. In 
and of itself, this is not a problem: a certain kind of epistemic caution may seem to be a virtue 
of academic researchers in general. However, scientists may often be in a position where they 
are the only people aware that certain claims, although not well-enough established to 
warrant “public” assertion, are well-enough established to warrant action by others in the 
community. Remaining silent in such cases may seem an unacceptable abrogation of moral 
duty, and, given the complexities of gathering, interpreting and assessing evidence, scientists 
may often be in such situations. It seems, then, that a full account of “public communication” 
should hold that even if scientists are under the high standards obligation when they make 
certain sorts of public claims – with the full authority of science, as it were – they may also 
have further obligations to “speak out” about claims which are well-enough established to 
warrant action by some in the community, even when they are not well-enough established to 
warrant action by any rational agent.
 10
  
 
These obligations to “speak out” are particularly important, because there is a significant risk 
that policy-makers and members of the public will mis-interpret or mis-understand scientists’ 
                                                          
10
 Note here the interesting relationship to the “precautionary principle” in environmental and public health 
policy-making, which some authors (e.g. Sunstein, 2005) read as a reminder to policy-makers that a threat may 
be sufficiently well-warranted to justify action even if it is not sufficiently well-warranted to be “scientifically 
certain” of its existence. The proposals above suggest that as well as reminding policy-makers to beware of 
scientific reticence, maybe scientists should sometimes be less reticent. See John, 2010, for further comments on 
how the problem of inductive risk relates to interpreting the precautionary principle. 
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silence on various hypotheses as evidence that those hypotheses are not well-enough 
established to warrant action.  Consider, for example, Lord de Mauley, the UK environment 
minister, who justified the UK government’s vote against an EU-wide ban on neonicitinoids 
as follows: “having a healthy bee population is a top priority for us but we did not support the 
proposal because our scientific evidence doesn't support it” (quoted in Carrington, 2013).  It 
seems plausible that de Mauley is confusing the claim that “scientific evidence” does not 
suffice to treat this claim as “scientifically proven” with the claim that “scientific evidence 
does not suffice to treat this claim as well-enough established for policy”. It seems that, in 
virtue of their more general civic duties, scientists have an obligation to prevent and pre-empt 
such confusions through “speaking out”. 
 
Even if, as I have claimed, the “high standards obligation” should govern scientists’ public 
claims, clearly this does not exhaust the ethics of scientific communication. Rather, we must 
also recognise scientists’ obligations to employ floating standards in private contexts and 
their obligations to speak out in “quasi-private” contexts. I take the claim that scientists might 
be under such obligations to be (relatively) uncontroversial. The key issue, however, is how 
we might construct institutions which allow scientists to meet these obligations at the same 
time as ensuring that they might maintain high standards in public communication. I am no 
expert in institutional design, but note here two reasons to think that creating institutions 
which promote these goals is likely to be both practically and morally complex. 
 
The first set of potential problems concerns the institutionalisation of the FSO in “private 
contexts”. One problem here – already flagged above – is that even when scientists have a 
specific audience for their research, different members of that audience might have different 
proper standards for acceptance. It is unclear, for example, how to ensure that scientists at 
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EFSA employ the standards proper to “their” audience – EU policy-makers – given the 
widely different contexts of agricultural policy in different member states. A second problem 
arises because there may be actors who are not the intended audience of private 
communication, but who have a valid interest in being able to predict how scientists decide 
what to communicate in those contexts. For example, in relating her proposals to practice, 
Douglas (2009, Chapter 7) discusses the “inference guidelines” supplied by the US National 
Research Councils, which mandate inferences from evidence of chemicals’ toxicity in 
animals to claims about their toxicity in humans. In my terms, these guidelines seem to tell 
scientists to use “low epistemic standards” for assertion, as they recommend cross-species 
extrapolations which are known to be epistemically problematic. Given that NRC-funded 
scientists are typically communicating in a “private context” this practice may be in-line with 
the demands of the FSO. However, as Douglas notes, formulation of these guidelines was 
plagued by debate over the freedom scientists should have to change their testing practices on 
a case-by-case basis, because of fears that this would make the testing regime opaque and 
unpredictable (2009, 144). Clearly, other members of the community – such as industrial or 
charitable actors – do have some reasonable interest in transparent and predictable regulatory 
decisions. Therefore, even in private contexts such as regulatory agencies, there may be a 
difficult trade-off to be struck between moral sensitivity and broader social co-ordination. 
Even if we can justify institutions which allow for “low” standards, there may be restrictions 
on whether these standards should also be allowed to vary. 
 
As well as these practical issues, institutional design may be morally complicated. One 
reason to be concerned about how scientists set their epistemic standards is that non-scientists 
often defer to their testimony. That is to say, scientists enjoy a kind of “epistemic authority” 
(Douglas 2009, 135). In turn, this power seems to generate responsibility: because others will 
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defer to scientists, scientists should be careful in how they trade-off false positives and false 
negatives. Why, though, do non-scientists defer to scientists? Above, I suggested that, at least 
in public communicative contexts, part of the answer lies in scientists’ adherence to high 
epistemic standards. We defer to scientists’ public assertions because we can reasonably 
assume that, whatever our interests, if scientists assert some claim, we should accept that 
claim (at least, as long as scientific institutions are working well). If so, scientists who vary 
their standards in private contexts or who speak out in public debate may be in a morally 
complicated situation, because they may be speaking with an authority which, properly 
speaking, they only enjoy in the “public” setting. Therefore, any account of how we should 
institutionalize scientists’ broader communicative obligations, while retaining their 
commitment to “high epistemic standards” in public settings, will have to be alert to this risk 
of moral “passing off”. Neither this nor the previous problem shows that we cannot create 
institutions which reflect the whole range of scientists’ obligations, allowing, for example, 
that they might say one thing in Brussels, another thing in a journal, and a third thing in a 
newspaper editorial. What they do suggest, however is that constructing such institutions will 
be practically difficult, and that any set of institutions governing scientific communication 
might have significant moral costs.    
 
In concluding this section’s discussion of the complex normative problems raised by my 
arguments, it is useful to clarify how these worries relate to the “scope” of arguments from 
inductive risk.  Sometimes, the argument from inductive risk is understood to imply a need 
for non-epistemic value judgments in all scientific work (Douglas, 2009, Chap.3). 
Sometimes, it is understood more modestly as implying a need for non-epistemic value 
judgments when scientists act as “policy-advisors” (Steele 2012). The argument from 
inductive risk is, I suggest, attractive as an account of policy-advice (although note the 
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serious caveats above about how to institutionalise these concerns). However, because the 
argument is often framed in terms of how scientists should resolve a problem which arises in 
all scientific research – how to balance risks of false positives against risks of false negatives 
in inductive inference – it can be easy to think of “regulatory science” simply as a vivid 
example of a more general phenomenon, and that the norms proper for these cases are proper 
for all scientific research. I have argued that if we focus attention on contexts of 
communication, however, we can accept the force of the argument as an account of scientists’ 
obligations qua policy-advisors, but not qua scientists.  
 
Note how this differs from an alternative strategy for limiting the argument from inductive 
risk to policy advice: that, even if the argument is relevant to some cases of “applied 
science”, it cannot be relevant to “theoretical science” because such research is often not 
directly relevant to any possible action (Levi 1960). My claims above do not rest on a 
distinction between types of research – I have argued that even when scientists are working in 
obviously practical fields, they have good reason to adopt high standards for public 
communication – but on types of communication.11 In effect, I deny that there is a single 
answer to the normative problem of inductive risk; rather, it depends on audience. 
  
 
 
                                                          
11
 Furthermore, the proposed distinction between different forms of communication is preferable to Elliott’s 
similarly pluralistic suggestion that the propriety of scientists’ appeal to values depends on the particular “goals” 
prioritized in their context (see, for example, Elliott, 2013, p.381; Elliott and McKaughan, 2014). Elliott’s 
approach might seem to justify not appealing to non-epistemic values in, for example, journal articles if the 
“goals” of that activity are promoting truth, rather than aiding regulation. However, it is unclear why the fact 
that a scientist has a particular epistemic goal should grant her exemption from other moral considerations. What 
my argument does, then, is to “fill in” a non-epistemic justification for pursuing what might seem to be 
epistemic goals.    
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5. From freedom to neutrality; from ideal to second-best 
 
The argument from inductive risk is often taken to show a problem for the “value free ideal” 
for science. Given the complexities around distinguishing different kinds and possible roles 
of value judgment in science, it can be unclear precisely what proponents of this ideal are 
committed to, but Gregor Betz’s recent definition – “the justification of scientific 
findings should not be based on non-epistemic (e.g. moral or political) values” (Betz 2013, 
207) – captures the key idea. In conclusion, then, I will outline the implications of my 
arguments for the broader debate over the proper role of values in science. 
 
I suggest that debates over “value freedom” often embody two confusions. First, as my 
comments on Rudner and Jeffrey at the end of §2 noted, many seem to assume that accepting 
that scientists do solve problems of inductive risk implies denying the value free ideal. 
Second, it may seem that defenders of the Value Free Ideal must ignore or downplay the 
complex relationships between (much) scientific inquiry and economic, social and political 
goals, in favour of a focus on the purely epistemic goals of inquiry. However, it is unclear 
that defenders of the Value Free Ideal must deny that scientists face problems of inductive 
risk or that much scientific inquiry is of great practical relevance. On the first point, as I 
noted in §1, we might concede that scientists do solve problems of inductive risk but deny 
that this involves appeal to non-epistemic values, as opposed to adherence to institutionalised 
standards. In turn, as §3 noted, but did not develop, use of “high standards” might be justified 
on purely “epistemic” grounds, as related to the generation of knowledge. On the second 
point, Betz’s own defence of value free science is motivated partly on the grounds that were 
scientists to appeal to non-epistemic values even “indirectly” in their work, they would 
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violate important democratic norms, according to which the people, rather than experts, 
should choose which values guide policy. I disagree with Betz’s particular claims here – as 
scientists might take account of non-epistemic values but respect democratic norms if they 
were explicit on these value-judgments (Elliott, 2013) – but his general strategy raises an 
important point: the politically embedded nature of science may be a reason for, rather than 
against, value-free science.      
 
This paper has developed both of these general thoughts in the following way. As I argued in 
§3, attempting to justify scientists’ use of high epistemic standards by appeal solely to 
epistemic goods seems a weak response to the moral concerns raised by arguments from 
inductive risk. Although some think that it is important to show that an indirect role for 
values in science is compatible with a concern for epistemic values (Steel, 2010), the real 
challenge of the argument from inductive risk is, I suggest, that it makes us question the value 
of knowledge. It does so by reminding us that, for practical purposes, we might be better-off 
acting on not-known claims than only acting on known claims. However, I responded to this 
moral argument by a dual-level response, which distinguishes between the values which can 
be appealed to within a practice, and the values which we should use to justify having such a 
practice. At the first level – that of the practice of science – I have claimed, in-line with the 
Value Free Ideal, that scientists should not appeal to non-epistemic values in deciding which 
claims to make. However, this defence of “high epistemic standards”, which help to generate 
“knowledge”, does not itself appeal to the value of knowledge. Rather, I have argued for this 
practice in terms of how it allows for an efficient co-ordination of experts’ claims and non-
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experts’ practical needs. That is to say, I have defended excluding non-epistemic values from 
science by appeal to non-epistemic values.
12
  
 
At this point, some readers might be worried that these remarks, with their apparently strong 
distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic values and concerns, are in tension with an 
important strand in recent epistemology, according to which knowledge-ascriptions (perhaps 
even knowledge) are related to ascribers’ or subjects’ practical interests (Fantl and McGrath, 
2012). For many epistemologists, it seems that knowledge does not require “high epistemic 
standards”. However, note that the empirical data supporting claims of “pragmatic 
encroachment” are contestable (Gerken 2012). Furthermore, David Henderson (2011) has 
argued for a route from contextualist accounts of knowledge to the conclusion that scientific 
claims should be treated as known only when they meet high standards, on grounds similar to 
those above: that scientific communities are “general-purpose source communities – 
communities of inquirers having a social role of producing information of such a high 
epistemic quality that a somewhat indeterminate range of groups might freely draw on their 
results without hesitation." (87) Therefore, trends in contemporary epistemology which may 
seem to complicate my conclusions in fact lend support to the general thrust of my argument. 
 
I have, then, argued that there is a version of the Value Free Ideal which is consistent with the 
claim that scientists solve problems of inductive risk, and which not merely recognises but is 
built upon an acknowledgment of the social, economic and political relevance of scientific 
                                                          
12
 Note then that there may be an interesting analogy here between scientific and legal contexts. In a recent 
paper, Enoch, Talia and Fisher (2012) have argued that courts’ refusal to use statistical evidence might be 
understood in terms of the epistemic good of “sensitivity”. However, as they also note, that we can redescribe 
courts’ practices in this way leaves open a further justificatory question: why should courts care about this 
epistemic good, given that the exclusion of statistical evidence often seems to conflict with important aims of 
the legal system. They suggest, then, that “policy” considerations must be used to justify this practice. I suggest 
that a similar dual-level structure applies in the case of science. 
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research. However, it is unclear that this defence counts as a complete vindication of the 
Value Free Ideal for two reasons. First, my argument for “value free” science has turned on 
the importance of a certain form of “value neutrality” in public communications within 
societies characterised by value pluralism. I suspect that this may seem rather a weak 
argument to many who think that science ought to be value-free, who might hope for a more 
full-blooded commitment to epistemic values. Second, as I stressed in §4, the form of “value 
neutrality” I endorse in this paper is not unproblematic, but can create its own problems and 
difficulties. It is, as it were, not so much an “ideal” to be strived for, but the best available 
solution to a complex co-ordination problem, which still leaves many problems to be solved. 
The real lesson, then, may be that talk of the role of “values” in research requires 
supplementation by more discussion of the norms of communication.
13
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